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Mainstream choice theory is based on a complete map of preferences and fully known 
income. This is extended into the future by invoking state-contingent preferences. 
Under these conditions there is only one possible ‘choice’. There is perfect knowledge 
or its stochastic equivalent, and therefore no uncertainty. The exercise of this ‘choice’ 
is seen as evidence of rationality. The identification of rationality with perfect 
knowledge goes back to the Greeks (Vercelli 1991), but the requirement of perfect 
knowledge flies in the face of rationality in the sense used in everyday life. Perfect 
knowledge of the present and past is beyond the capacity of any human brain, and the 
fact that certain knowledge of the future is impossible is acknowledged by all who are 
rational in the ordinary sense. Although perfect-knowledge rationality is used as the 
benchmark in mainstream evaluations of theory, to believe that we possess it is 
irrational in the extreme. Indeed if you were in a situation of certainty, how would you 
know? (Dow 1995). 
 
The tendency in mainstream economics is to regard any lapse from perfect knowledge 
as total ignorance and from full-information rationality as irrationality. Uncertainty 
would leave the decision-maker in paralysis or motivated by pure emotion. Our starting 
point, by contrast, is the acceptance that we live and make decisions in what Shackle 
(1972: 68-9) called the ‘epistemic interval’ between these two extremes: in this interval 
we have some knowledge of the past and present and some limited ability to imagine 
and evaluate probable outcomes in an intrinsically uncertain future. In this interval, 
uncertainty does not paralyse us and our cognitive faculties are still useful to us.  
 
Keynes’s attempt to model rigorously the process by which one might prepare decisions 
under uncertainty (or partial knowledge) was perhaps the first to claim the attention of 
heterodox economists. He framed his enquiry (Keynes 1921) in terms of evidential 
propositions, h, and the conclusions, a, which may follow from them with a probability 
α. Symbolically, a/h = α. If α = 1, the connection is certain; if α = 0, there is no 
connection. In between, there is some probability that a follows from h which allows 
decision-makers to make inferences, albeit uncertain ones – to have a ‘degree of rational 
belief’ in the results of their actions. Clearly, most of the time this probability cannot 
be assigned a numerical value; but the probabilities of different conclusions following 
from their evidential propositions can be ranked under certain circumstances (Keynes 
1921: 40-43). 
 
There is scope for varying degrees of confidence in these inferences depending on the 
weight of argument supporting the belief, i.e. the amount of relevant evidence relative 
to the amount of relevant ignorance. But the understanding both of the evidence itself 
and of its relevance is a matter of judgement. Further, being based also on conventional 
judgement and on psychological factors, judgement is prone to discrete shifts. Keynes 
referred to a range of conventions to deal with uncertainty, such as assuming that the 
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past is a better guide to the future than we know to be the case. But other powerful 
conventions are distinctly social, such as following the market view. 
 
When Shackle turned to the question of decision under uncertainty, he stressed the role 
of imagination and also of emotion: ‘Choice’, he said, ‘is a business of the whole psyche’ 
(1972, p. 85). First, he chose the opposite benchmark: not the degree of certainty but 
the extent of doubt, embodied in his concept of ‘potential surprise’ in contemplating 
both positive and negative outcomes. His reason was that ‘degrees of belief’ offered 
little scope for gradation, whereas surprise allowed for a rich range. He was interested 
in how one might go about evaluating a single project; therefore Keynes’s scheme of 
comparisons of probability across relations was no use to him. It is also notable that 
surprise, even imagined surprise, is something that the entrepreneur would feel. There 
is a range of outcomes in the area around a neutral outcome which would occasion no 
surprise. He then finds a way to derive two points which command the maximum 
attention. He calls these focus gain and focus loss: the outcomes combining desirability 
(positively) and surprise (negatively) which represent the maximum reasonable hope of 
gain and fear of loss. Having standardised these, they are compared to ‘gambler 
indifference curves’, and the combination which gives the highest anticipated yield will 
determine the project selected. 
 
This is quite a rigmarole (explained fully in Shackle 1961), and it is plainly not how 
any entrepreneur actually thinks – certainly not consciously. Its purpose is to try to 
make explicit the intuitive processes based on partial knowledge and previous 
experience in making decisions in an uncertain world. The concept of focus points 
usefully addresses the need for economy in the use of mental resources when faced with 
the complexity of such decisions. Shackle’s construction dispenses with probability of 
any kind.  
 
We come to the application of decision under uncertainty in the context of wider theory. 
This was such an innovation at the time that Hicks (1936) regarded Keynes’s General 
Theory (1936) as having introduced a new method, the method of expectations. Yet 
Keynes’s theory of expectations was disregarded in the 1970s when rational 
expectations theorists introduced their own new method of expectations addressed to 
the experience at the time of rising inflation. This method focused on agents basing 
their quantified probabilistic forecasts on the same (closed) models as those generated 
by economists; there was no scope for surprise. This framework is unable to address 
decision-making under the uncertainty which necessarily follows from the economic 
system being open, as Keynes himself had argued (Loasby 1993). 
 
Of the four contexts in which Keynes referred to expectations (investment, output, user 
cost and liquidity preference), the role of uncertainty is best understood in the case of 
investment. Keynes sets out a calculation, relying on expected profits over the life of 
an investment project, to be compared to the rate of interest to assess the project’s 
viability. But he cautions that these expectations are very uncertain, the more so the 
longer-lived the equipment, and that it would be unlikely for any investment to be 
undertaken were not entrepreneurs full of ‘animal spirits’, the spontaneous urge to 
actions which can override the doubts attached to these calculations. The introduction 
of temperament does not invalidate the calculations: they are complementary (Dow and 
Dow 1985). 
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Having raised the term ‘animal spirits’, it is worth noting two things about the recent 
book of that title (Akerlof and Shiller 2010). The first and most important is that they 
lump together all sorts of responses not covered by traditional full-information 
maximising under that title (whereas Keynes’s use of it was quite precise). The second 
is that these are all accounted as irrational responses or non-economic preferences. 
Although the recognition of factors beyond utility maximisation is welcome, there is 
no idea that they might serve a complementary role in a theory of behaviour which is 
rational in the ordinary sense of the term. This would entail describing these factors as 
lying in another dimension from full-knowledge rationality, not as its negation 
(although there is a hint of this in their use, when discussing confidence, of the 
expression ‘beyond rationality’ rather than ‘irrationality’). Nuti (2009) goes further: he 
argues that the factors Akerlof and Shiller place under the umbrella of ‘animal spirits’ 
are analysed in economics already under other names. 
 
While Keynes also discussed expectations in relation to output decisions and user cost 
(Chick 1983, 1992), the expectations formed by the speculators in financial markets, 
who form part of the analysis of liquidity preference, is of a different order. While there 
is a social element even to individual entrepreneurs’ expectations-formation, social 
convention is much more powerful in financial markets. Agents are betting on capital 
gains and losses on securities or equities. This translates into forming expectations not 
about some fundamental rate of return but likely movements in market sentiment, as 
these affect changes in equity prices or the rate of interest (the inverse of bond prices). 
When the market as a whole is in substantial agreement, asset prices can be quite 
unstable, for stability comes from having traders on both sides of the market: ‘Best of 
all that we should know the future. But if not, … it is important that opinions should 
differ’ (Keynes 1936: 172). 
 
Since, as explained above, expectations in Keynes are substantially conventional and 
subject to discrete shifts, there is no such thing as a ‘true’ valuation of assets. Indeed, 
in a very important, short piece, Townshend (1937) pointed out that all prices are 
influenced by expectations and speculation. This implication of Keynes’s theory of 
choice under uncertainty is critical for analysis of financial markets. Behavioural 
finance is currently being developed to explain swings in asset prices away from their 
‘true’ values in terms of various forms of modification to mainstream choice theory to 
take account of what they deem ‘irrational’ factors. This work is to be distinguished 
from the original behavioural economics spearheaded by Simon (1955), whose notion 
of bounded rationality followed not just from cognitive limitations but also from the 
open nature of social reality. It is important to note that an absence of true valuations 
does not leave asset prices completely up in the air, since reason and evidence are 
generally employed as far as possible in exercising judgement; this is bounded 
rationality. Nevertheless the ebb and flow of conventional judgement in a creative 
environment means that market valuations normally fluctuate (see Frydman and 
Goldberg 2011). In all of this the emotional element in exercising judgement is 
inescapable. Psychological theory has been used to explain how this can go too far: 
reason and evidence can be suppressed, allowing full rein to emotion and leading to 
wilder swings in asset valuation (see Tuckett and Taffler 2008).  
  
Theories of decision-making under uncertainty present a variety of approaches by 
which one might come to a reasonable estimate of the consequences of projected actions. 
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But they have in common a connection with the wider society and its conventions, and 
with the individual’s hopes and fears, as integral elements in the decision process. 
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